Article body copy

A new video appears on the social media network Telegram: footage of the smoking area aboard a large vessel. The curtains are ripped, the lights are broken, and ash and glass litter the floor. “This is how they drink on our ship,” says the young Ukrainian deck worker filming the scene, turning to show the furniture thrown to the corner of the room. “I’m freaked out.”

A Telegram administrator asks the deck worker if he can share the vessel’s name. They change the ship’s name multiple times a year, replies Feliks Bondar, whose own name has been changed for this story. “I don’t even know what name to tell you,” he writes in Ukrainian. “Our ship was originally called Eagle, but in Venezuela, we were Matador and then Shoyo Maru.”

A chorus of similar messages had flooded the chat in recent months: stories of dangerously rundown ships, operators withholding pay, abandoned crew members, and vessel owners changing ship names or manipulating their automatic identification systems (AIS)—the global network meant to help ships recognize each other.

The Telegram group hosts over 8,000 sailors. Some are fresh out of maritime college, others are seasoned captains. All are drawn to the group by a desire to stay safe on the high seas. By telling their stories and naming names—when they can—these sailors have been gathering information about problematic vessels, detailing everything from those with low-quality food to ships where crews often experience pay delays.

But in recent years, as more sailors are finding themselves unwittingly involved in the so-called shadow fleet—smuggling oil for Iran, Russia, or other clients that have been hit by strict sanctions to restrict their sales of oil—the social media whisper network has evolved. As well as a place to find a reputable employer, it’s become something else: a way for seafarers to avoid helping the other side of a war.

Life as a contract seafarer has never been easy. Workers frequently hop from ship to ship, contract to contract, and country to country. But the rise of the shadow fleet—along with Russia’s war in Ukraine—poses a new kind of risk.

About a year and a half ago, in early 2023, Bondar sought out the seafarers’ Telegram network after a particularly troubling gig. Booked to the job by an Ukraine-based crewing agency, Bondar found that the name of his assigned vessel had been painted over, and the AIS was, once again, unplugged. A note on top of the device warned seafarers not to turn it on.

After a six-month voyage smuggling sanctioned oil to China, Bondar says the crew was told its next operation would begin in Koz’mino, Russia. Russia’s most recent invasion of Ukraine had begun while he was at sea and had already been underway for over four months. Bondar and the other Ukrainians on board refused to work smuggling Russian oil. The ship’s operator allegedly fired them all, ditching them at the nearest port in China.

“Nothing will surprise me anymore,” Bondar wrote in the Telegram group. “I have accumulated enough ‘sea stories’ for the rest of my life.”

The war in Ukraine is taking a huge toll, not only on the soldiers on the front lines but on Ukrainians worldwide. Earlier this year, Stella Maris, an English charity committed to seafarer well-being, reported that depression and anxiety are rising among Ukrainian seafarers. These Ukrainians are trying to provide for their families while worrying about the safety of their loved ones, the future of their homeland, tensions with Russian seafarers, and the fear of conscription if they return home. With Russian troops capitalizing on Ukraine’s temporary weapons shortage—caused by the delayed delivery of Western aid—the plight of Ukraine’s people, including its seafarers, shows little sign of letting up.

Bondar’s was not an isolated incident. Recruitment for the shadow fleet is a complex web of crewing agencies, shell companies, and absentee ship owners. Crewing agencies, tasked with finding seafarers to fill contracts, often know very little about the ships, their cargo, or their owners, creating the ideal conditions for deception. But maritime recruitment data shows that at least six Ukrainian crewing agencies have been involved in sourcing seafarers for 10 Russian ships smuggling oil since Russia began its invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

Starting from a list of known Russia-affiliated oil smuggling vessels kept by the nonprofit watchdog United Against Nuclear Iran, journalist Nathaniel Peutherer was able to cross reference the ships on that list against old job postings by using vessel identification numbers kept by the International Maritime Organization. The names of vessels involved in the shadow fleet are regularly changed, but their identification numbers do not vary. For cases where the ship owners hid their vessel’s identification number, Peutherer used a specific set of ship characteristics to match job postings to a particular vessel. Other vessels were confirmed directly by contacting crewing agencies. These alternative approaches make tracking vessels through their myriad identity changes somewhat possible. Photo by Em Campos/Alamy Stock Photo

Mazhnuna Karaca, head of operations at Dese Crew Management, a Ukraine-based crewing agency, says she only found out after the fact that her company had been unintentionally trying to solicit seafarers for illegal Russian oil-smuggling operations.

On February 8, 2023, an advertisement seeking crew for a large oil tanker appeared on maritime job forums. The ship’s official identification number along with anything else that might easily identify the vessel were conveniently absent. Karaca, however, confirmed the ship to be the Danica, a vessel that had been featured on a shadow fleet watch list compiled by United Against Nuclear Iran, a US-based nonprofit, since December 2022.

Ships such as the Danica that transport illegal oil violate sanctions meant to restrict the economic opportunities of nations that threaten global security. In so doing, the vessels’ owners enable those nations to fund their activities.

DESE Crew Management tried to recruit seafarers for the Danica and two other ships that were later revealed to be part of the Russian shadow fleet. Fortunately, says Karaca, her company never succeeded in sending anyone to the Danica or any of the other known shadow fleet ships during their illicit operations. But only “because rumors spread quickly between sailors,” she says.

Each time Dese found a suitable candidate for the Danica, the sailor would abruptly change their mind and refuse to board. That had puzzled Karaca and her staff—until she learned about a different online seafarer whisper network, where details were whirling.

Among seafarers, the company that owns the Danica had a reputation. Digging in deeper, Karaca says the company was originally named Sand & Sea Marine—before it rebranded to Linda Shipping in an attempt to escape its reputation for unsafe conditions, withholding pay, and abandoning crew.

Once aware of the Danica’s and the other ships’ involvement in the shadow fleet, Dese Crew Management promptly blacklisted the vessels. Other crewing agencies, however, have been less helpful. On Telegram, some seafarers even believe that crewing agencies have infiltrated the group to post fake positive reviews about the conditions aboard vessels for which they are trying to recruit crew.

Fortunately, the seafarers aren’t so gullible: “This is automated bots or the manager has told everyone to write for them,” one sailor wrote below a suspiciously positive set of reviews. “They shout so much that they are not scammers that I think the opposite,” another adds with a laugh.

During an assembly in December 2023, the International Maritime Organization (IMO)—the branch of the United Nations tasked with managing international maritime transport—urged member states to do more to derail the shadow fleet.

The IMO has encouraged cooperation between coastal member states to help identify suspicious ship-to-ship transfer operations and AIS manipulation, citing risks to “the safety, well-being, and potential criminalization of the crew.” The European Union has called for similar actions while also announcing new sanctions that require the details of any tanker being sold to a Russian entity—including information about the buyer and seller—to be disclosed publicly, opening the door for governments to step in and block the sale if they think the ship might find its way into the shadow fleet.

So far, international regulators have yet to comment on the role crewing agencies play in supplying workers to the shadow fleet. Future guidance could extend the Maritime Labour Convention, calling on member states to ensure that independent crewing agencies operating within their territory receive the IMO numbers of the vessels they work with before advertising positions to seafarers.

Until the shadow fleet is brought under control, seafarers will continue whispering over the water and doing what they can to keep themselves—and each other—safe.